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Abstract
This Note argues that the United States must comply with its responsibilities under the Headquarters Agreement, especially its obligation to arbitrate disputes. Part I discusses the negotiations
and subsequent interpretations of the Headquarters Agreement. Part II examines the dispute that
arose when the United States enacted the ATA. Part III argues that both domestic law and international law require that the United States abide by the dispute settlement clause of the Headquarters
Agreement. This Note conclude that the United States must demonstrate respect for its obligations
under the Headquarters Agreement, in addition to other U.N.-related obligations, or its status as
host country and as a trustworthy treaty partner.

THE PLO OBSERVER MISSION DISPUTE: AN
ARGUMENT FOR U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH
THE U.N. HEADQUARTERS
AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION
In 1947, the United States and the United Nations signed
the Agreement Between the United Nations and the United
States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations (the "Headquarters Agreement" or the "Agreement").' The Agreement contained a dispute settlement
clause that required the United States and the United Nations
to submit to arbitration disputes between them arising out of
the Agreement's interpretation or application. 2 In 1987, the
United Nations claimed that the United States violated this requirement of the Agreement when the United States passed
the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (the "ATA" or the "Act")'
and, pursuant to the Act, petitioned a U.S. court to close the
Palestinian Liberation Organization's observer mission to the
United Nations (the "PLO Observer Mission").4 The United
Nations claimed that the United States should have abided by
the dispute settlement clause in the Headquarters Agreement
before resorting to its domestic court to implement the ATA. 5
The International Court of Justice (the "ICJ")6 held, in an ad1. June 26, 1947, United Nations-United States, 61 Stat. 756, T.I.A.S. No.
1676, 11 U.N.T.S. I1 [hereinafter Headquarters Agreement].
2. Id. sec. 21, 61 Stat. at 764, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 18, 11 U.N.T.S. at 30; see
infra note 19 (setting forth text of arbitration section).
3. Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988-89, Pub. L. No.
100-204, tit. X, 101 Stat. 1331 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201-5203 (West Supp.
1989)).
4. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
6. The International Court ofiustice (the "ICJ") was established in 1945 in conjunction with the United Nations at the San Francisco conference of 50 nations that
established the United Nations. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 92-96; see also G. ELIAN, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 40 (1971). The fifty nations met from April 25
through June 26, a period that also marked the German surrender in World War II.
Id. This conference saw the creation and approval of the U.N. Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the "Statute"), which was integrally connected with the U.N. Charter. Id. Articles 92-96 deal with the creation of the ICJ.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 92-96. Article 92 states that the ICJ is the principle judicial organ
of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. Article 93 considers all U.N. member
states as parties to the statute of the ICJ and allows any non-member state to apply to
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visory opinion, that international law required the United
States to settle the dispute through arbitration. 7 However, the
U.S. court retained jurisdiction, claiming that domestic law re8
quired it to hear the case.
This Note argues that the United States must comply with
its responsibilities under the Headquarters Agreement, especially its obligation to arbitrate disputes. Part I discusses the
negotiations and subsequent interpretations of the Headquarters Agreement. Part II examines the dispute that arose when
the United States enacted the ATA. Part III argues that both
U.S. domestic law and international law require that the United
States abide by the dispute settlement clause of the Headquarters Agreement. This Note concludes that the United States
must demonstrate respect for its obligations under the Headquarters Agreement, in addition to other U.N.-related obligations, or its status as host country and as a trustworthy treaty
partner will be jeopardized.
I. THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT: NEGOTIATIONS
AND SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATIONS
A. The Agreement's Elements and Initial Negotiations
The United States, having played a major role in the foundation of the United Nations, 9 invited the organization to esthe General Assembly to become a party to the Statute. Id. art. 93. Article 94 calls
for U.N. members to comply with ICJ judgments in cases to which they are parties.
Id. art. 94. Finally, article 96 gives the U.N. General Assembly or the Security Council the right to request advisory opinions on legal questions from the ICJ. Id. art. 96;
see also G. ELIAN, supra, at 46. The actual statute of the ICJ deals with its organization,
its jurisdiction, its procedures, its advisory opinions, and the process for amending
the Statute. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993, at 25. Two relevant provisions of the Statute involve, first, the
fact that only states, not international organizations, may be parties before the court
(the United Nations may only ask the ICJ for advisory opinions) id. art. 34, 59 Stat. at
1059, T.S. No. 993, at 29, and second, the fact that ICJ's decisions are based on
international law conventions, international custom and, in a lesser sense, judicial
precedent. Id. art. 38, 59 Stat. at 1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30; see G. ELIAN, supra, at 5556.
7. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26June 1947 (U.N. v. U.S.), 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 808 (May 1988); see infra notes 87157 and accompanying text.
8. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); see infra notes 165-200 and accompanying text.
9. 1 E. LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 18 (1982). In 1940, prior to
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tablish its headquarters within U.S. borders.' ° After the
United Nations accepted this offer," the United States and the2
United Nations approved the Headquarters Agreement,'
which established the rights and duties of both the United Nations and the United States in relation to this headquarters
site.' 3 In general, the Headquarters Agreement contains an
World War II, the U.S. Department of State discussed the formation of a new inter-

national body. Id. at 17-18. See generally 1 M. Ku, A

COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 94-106 (1978) (providing documents relating to the formation
of the United Nations); R. RIGGS & J. PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 1-21 (1988) (historical perspective of the United

Nations).
10. H.R. Con. Res. 75, 59 Stat. 848 (1945). This resolution passed by the
House of Representatives, with the Senate concurring, on Dec. 11, 1945, invited the
United Nations to locate its seat within the United States. Id.
11. G.A. Res. 22(B), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 27-28 (1946). This resolution authorized the Secretary-General, together with the negotiating committee, to negotiate
with the United States the necessary arrangements involved in the establishment of
its seat in the United States. Id. The committee agreed to locate its seat in the New
York City area. G.A. Res. 99(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. I, at 195 (1946). The United
Nations accepted the offer made byJohn D. Rockefeller of US$8,500,000 to purchase
a specific tract of land in New York City. G.A. Res. 100(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at
196 (1946).
12. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 1.
13. Id. The Headquarters Agreement deals with the following rights and duties:
Article II includes the rights of the United Nations to maintain broadcasting facilities
and the right to establish an aerodrome if necessary. Id. art. II, secs. 4-5, 61 Stat. at
759, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 3-5, 11 U.N.T.S. at 14-16. Article III deals with the law
and authority in the headquarters district. Id. art. III, secs. 7-10, 61 Stat. at 760-61,
T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 6-9, 11 U.N.T.S. at 18-20. Article IV relates to matters of communications and transit. Id. art. IV, secs. 11-14, 61 Stat. at 761-62, T.I.A.S. No.
1676, at 9-13, 11 U.N.T.S. at 20-24. Article V refers to resident representatives of
the United Nations. Id. art. V, sec. 15, 61 Stat. at 762-63, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 13-15,
11 U.N.T.S. at 26. Article VI involves police protection of the headquarters district.
Id. art. VI, sec. 16, 61 Stat. at 763, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 15, 11 U.N.T.S. at 26-28.
Article VII relates to public services and protection of the headquarters district. Id.
art. VII, secs. 17-19, 61 Stat. at 763-64, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 16-17, 11 U.N.T.S. at
28-30. Article VIII defines matters relating to the operation of the Agreement including the dispute settlement clause. Id. art. VIII, secs. 20-21, 61 Stat. at 764,
T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 17-18, 11 U.N.T.S. at 30. Article IX relates to miscellaneous
provisions. Id. art. IX, secs. 22-28, 61 Stat. at 764-66, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 18-22, 11
U.N.T.S. at 30-34. Annex I defines the headquarters district as encompassing the
area between First Avenue and the Franklin 1). Roosevelt Drive, from 42nd to 48th
Streets in Manhattan. Id. annex I, 61 Stat. at 766, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 23, 11
U.N.T.S. at 36. Annex 2 deals with the maintenance of utilities. Id. annex II, secs. 12, 61 Stat. at 766-67, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 24, 11 U.N.T.S. at 36. In addition, the
U.S. Congress, in ajoint resolution authorizing the President to bring this agreement
into effect, Pub. L. No. 80-357, 61 Stat. 756, attached sections 3-6 into annex 2,
section 6 being the security clause. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 1, annex 2,
sec. 6, 61 Stat. at 767-68, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 27-30.
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access clause that enables member states and other invitees to
enter and exit the headquarters district' 4 regardless of their relationship with the United States.t 5 Further, the Headquarters
Agreement prohibits the United States from enforcing its alien
residence laws on those U.N. member states and invitees living
in the United States.' 6 However, the U.S. Congress added a
clause to the Headquarters Agreement that permits the United
States to safeguard its own security by restricting the entry of
aliens into parts of the United States outside the vicinity of the
headquarters district if those aliens pose a threat to the security of the United States.' 7 Finally, in light of the purpose of the
United Nations to codify international law and to foster world
peace, the Headquarters Agreement calls for a broad interpretation in favor of the United Nations. 18
In the event of a dispute between the United States and
14. Headquarters Agreement, supra note I, art. IV, sec. 11, 61 Stat. at 761,
T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 9-10, 11 U.N.T.S. at 20-22. Article IV, section 11 states:
The federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district of (1)
representatives of Members or officials of the United Nations . . . or (5)
other persons invited to the headquarters district by the United Nations...
on official business.

Id.
15. Id. art. IV, sec. 12, 61 Stat. at 761, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 10, 11 U.N.T.S. at
22. Article IV, section 12 states that "[t]he provisions of Section 1 shall be applicable irrespective of the relations existing between the Governments of the persons
referred to in that section and the Government of the United States." Id.
16. Id. art. IV, sec. 13, 61 Stat. at 761, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 10-11, 11 U.N.T.S.
at 22. Article IV, section 13 states that "[laws and regulations in force in the United
States regarding the residence of aliens shall not be applied ... to interfere with the
privileges referred to in section I l .... Id.
17. Id. annex 2, sec. 6, 61 Stat. at 767-68, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 30. Annex 2,
section 6 states that
[niothing in the agreement shall be construed as in any way diminishing,
abridging, or weakening the right of the United States to safeguard its own
security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of
the United States other than the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity, as to be defined in a supplemental agreement between the Government of the United States and the United Nations in pursuance of section
13(3)(e) of the agreement, and such areas as it is reasonably necessary to
traverse in transit between the same and foreign countries.
Id.; see also id. annex 1, 61 Stat. at 766, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 23, 1i U.N.T.S. at 36
(defining headquarters district as area between First Avenue and the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Drive, from 42nd to 48th Streets in Manhattan).
18. Id. art. IX, sec. 27, 61 Stat. at 765, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 21, 11 U.N.T.S. at
34. Article IX, section 27, states that "this agreement shall be construed in the light
of its primary purpose to enable the United Nations at its headquarters in the United
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the United Nations concerning the interpretation or application of the Headquarters Agreement, article VIII, section 21
provides a dispute settlement procedure.' 9 If there is such a
dispute, the United States and the United Nations must first
attempt to negotiate a resolution."z If these negotiations cannot resolve the dispute, article VIII, section 21 mandates that
the United States and the United Nations refer the dispute to a
tribunal of three arbitrators, one chosen by each party, the
third to be chosen jointly or, if they are unable to agree upon a
third, by the President of the ICJ.2 ' During the course of any
such dispute, the Secretary-General of the United Nations may
request an advisory opinion from the ICJ, which is to be taken
into account when the arbitral tribunal renders its final decision. zz
These terms were the result of negotiations between the
States, fully and efficiently to discharge its responsibilities and fulfill its purposes."
Id. The U.N. Charter states the purpose of the United Nations:
To maintain international peace and security ...;[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples .. .; [t]o achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character .. .; [and] [t]o be a center for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of these common ends.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
19. Headquarters Agreement, supra, note 1, art. VII, sec. 21, 61 Stat. at 764,
T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 18, II U.N.T.S. at 30. Article VII, section 21, states that
(a) Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States concerning the interpretation or application of this agreement or of any supplemental agreement, which is not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode
of settlement, shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by the Secretary-General, one to be named by the
Secretary of State of the United States, and the third to be chosen by the
two, or, if they should fail to agree upon a third, then by the President of the
International Court of Justice.
(b) The Secretary-General or the United States may ask the General
Assembly to request of the International Court ofJustice an advisory opinion on any legal question arising in the course of such proceedings. Pending the receipt of the opinion of the Court, an interim decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be observed by both parties. Thereafter, the arbitral tribunal shall render a final decision, having regard to the opinion of the
Court.
Id.
20. Id. art. VIII, sec. 21(a), 61 Stat. at 764, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 18, 11 U.N.T.S.
at 30.
21. Id.
22. Id. art. VIII, sec. 21(b), 61 Stat. at 764, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 18, 11 U.N.T.S.
at 30.
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United States and the United Nations that lasted from June 10
through June 19, 1946,23 prior to the selection of a permanent
site.2 4 Both the United States and the United Nations agreed
that disputes as to whether U.N. regulations would supersede
U.S. laws in the headquarters district or whether a U.S. law was
inconsistent with a U.N. regulation would be settled by arbitration and that, pending settlement, the U.N. regulation should
apply.2 5 In addition, the original suggestion for settling disputes involved an umpire, but this was replaced, at the suggestion Of the United States, by a board of three arbitrators.2 6
Further, the United States suggested including a provision that
the agreement be read in light of the purposes of the United
Nations, so that the arbitrators would not construe the agreement so as to limit the right of the United Nations to make
regulations.2 7
Following these negotiations, the United Nations asked
the United States about the effect of the Headquarters Agreement under U.S. law. More precisely, the U.N. Secretary-General questioned whether this agreement would operate similarly to a treaty, as the supreme law of the United States. 28 The
U.S. Attorney General answered in the affirmative.2 9 Finally,
the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations suggested
the addition of a clause pertaining to the right of the United
23. U.N. Doc. A/67 (1946).
24. Id. at 2.

25. Id. at 7.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id. at 7.
A provision . .. which, at the suggestion of the United States representatives, has been inserted at the end of the agreement, and which directs that
the agreement "shall be construed in the light of its purpose to enable the
United Nations at its headquarters in the United States of America fully and
efficiently to discharge its responsibilities and fulfil its purposes" should
prevent the arbitrators from placing a narrow construction on the United
Nations' right to make regulations.
Id. (quoting Convention/Agreement Between the United Nations and the United
States of America (Working Draft), U.N. Doc. A/67, at 11 (1946)).
28. Opinion of Acting Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Effectiveness of the Proposed Headquarters Agreement if Executed by the President
Pursuant to Authorization by a Joint Resolution of the Congress, U.N. Doc.
A/67/Add. 1 (1946). The United Nations asked for the Attorney General's opinion
of the following question: "Would the enclosed agreement when executed by the
President pursuant to authorization by a joint resolution of the Congress operate as
the supreme law of the land ... ?" Id. at I.
29. Id. at 1-2.
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States to safeguard its own security.30 Both the Senate Committee Report and a House Committee Report noted, however, that this security provision was not meant to interfere
with access necessary to the functioning of the United Nations.'
B. The Agreement's Subsequent Interpretation
There was a subsequent disagreement between the United
States and the United Nations regarding access to the headquarters district. 2 This dispute occurred in 1953, when the
United States refused to grant visas to two non-governmental
organization representatives, claiming that they both represented a security risk.3 A U.S. report explained that one of
these representatives, a Canadian national representing the
communist dominated Women's International Democratic
Federation, would probably engage in subversive activities af30. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO AcCEPT ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THE CONVENTION ON THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, S. REP. No. 559, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947) (accompanying S.J. Res. 144 and S.J. Res. 136).
31. Id. The Senate Committee report stated that, in its opinion, the provision of
article IV, section 13 of the Headquarters Agreement "adequately protect[sI the security of the United States and that the United Nations could not be expected to
maintain its headquarters in this country if the United States were to impose restrictions upon the access to the headquarters district which would interfere with the
proper functioning of the Organization." Id. at 6. In addition, in H.R. Rep. No.
1093, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), the House stated:
In general, the United States, as host country, must permit access to the
headquarters on the part of all persons who have legitimate business with
the Organization. This involves inevitably the admission of a number of
aliens, some of whom would not normally be admissible under immigration
laws of the United States. The United States has foreclosed itself in undertaking voluntarily the obligations of the host country.
Id. at 10-11.
32. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
33. U.N. Doc. E/2397 (1953), reprinted in[1952-54] 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 257. This memorandum by the legal department of the United Nations on the admission of representatives of non-governmental organizations enjoying observer status states in its summary of the facts that the United States denied
visa applications requested by two individuals who were invited by their respective
organizations (the Women's International Democratic Federation and the World
Federation of Trade Unions) to attend sessions of the U.N. Economic and Social

Council. Id. at 1-2, reprinted in[1952-54] 3

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

at 258. This denial by the United States was made pursuant to § 6 of the Headquarters Agreement, which deals with the right of the United States to protect its security.
Id. (quoting U.S. report to the Economic and Social Council); see also Y. Liang, Notes
on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 445-46 (1954).
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ter entering the United States. 4 All that was revealed about
the other representative was the fact that he presented a security risk. 5 The United States made it clear that the details regarding the specific reasons for visa denials were of a sensitive
nature and would not be disclosed. 6
Recognizing that a problem existed, the United States and
the United Nations negotiated a resolution to this situation
that clarified some of the relevant obligations under the Agreement.3 7 These included, first, that the United States had the
right to assure that people not use the the Headquarters
Agreement as a cover under which they could threaten the
country's security.38 Second, the United States could grant
limiting visas, valid only within the headquarters district and its
immediate vicinity, in order to protect its security. 9 Third, the
United States could reasonably redefine "the immediate vicinity" of the headquarters district, consistent with the headquarters' purpose, and could determine the expiration of the visa
following the completion of the official business.4" Fourth, the
United States could deport people admitted under the Headquarters Agreement who abused their privileges. 4 ' Fifth, the
rights of the United States were limited by the Headquarters
Agreement as interpreted above.4 2
34. [1952-54] 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 250-51 (telegram
from the U.S. Representative at United Nations to Department of State).
35. See U.N. Doc. E/2397, supra note 33, para. 3, reprinted in [ 1952-5413 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 257-58 (quoting the U.S. Representative's Report

to the Economic and Social Council).
36. [1952-54] 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES at 278. For a fuller
analysis of this incident, in addition to other similar problems that occurred during
this period, see id. at 195-312.
37. Progress Report by the Secretary-General on Negotiations with the United States of
America Concerning the Interpretation of the Headquarters Agreement, U.N. Doc. E/2492
(1953) [hereinafter Progress Report]; see infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.

38. Progress Report, supra note 37, at I. The Secretary-General and the Permanent Representative of the United States recognized at the beginning of their discussions "that the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement would not be permitted to
serve as a cover to enable persons in the United States to engage in activities, outside
the scope of their official functions, directed against the security of that country." Id.
at 1-2.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
In the case of aliens in transit to the Headquarters District exclusively
on official business of, or before, the United Nations, the rights of the
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The Secretary-General, in an oral statement to the Economic and Social Council, stated that in addition to successfully clarifying the rights and duties of both parties under the
Headquarters Agreement, he had negotiated with the United
States concerning the procedures to apply in such controversies.4 3 These procedures were based on three principles: (i)
an assurance that the United States would deal with such disputes at the highest governmental levels;4 4 (ii) that the United
States would give the United Nations a chance to act in a timely
fashion; 4 5 and (iii) that the United States would supply the
United Nations with all relevant information regarding the dispute so that the United Nations could determine whether or
not the actions violated the Headquarters Agreement.4 6 In the
same council meeting, the Secretary-General noted that
although this situation was resolved through negotiations, if it
had not been, it would have been necessary to submit the matter to arbitration. 47 The U.S. representative to this U.N. Council also recognized the Headquarters Agreement's dispute settlement procedure in relation to this matter.48
A second incident occurred in 1974, when the United Nations originally invited the Palestine Liberation Organization
(the "PLO") to set up an observer mission.4 9 B'nai B'rith sued
the United States in a U.S. federal court, claiming that the
United States are limited by the Headquarters Agreement to those mentioned. However, other cases may arise . . . . cases in which there is clear

and convincing evidence that a representative of a nongovernmental organization is coming to the United States purportedly for United Nations business but also, or primarily, for a purpose outside the scope of such activities,
and where further the competent authorities of the Government of the
United States are satisfied that the admission of that person would be prejudicial to the national security of the United States. In the opinion of the
United States representatives, such cases are outside the scope of the Headquarters Agreement, and they therefore hold that in such cases the United
States Government is entitled to refuse a visa.

Id.
43. Oral Statement Made by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/2501 (1953).
44. Id. "The decisions on the United States side will be taken at the highest
Id. at 3-4.
levels with the guarantees against mistakes and possible arbitrariness ....
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2-3.
48. U.S. ESCOR Representative's Statement to the Council, reprinted in 13 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 86-87 (1968).
49. G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31 (Agenda Item 108) at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974). This resolution states that the United Nations
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United States should not allow the PLO representatives to
enter the country.5 0 The court dismissed the case, contingent
upon an order that gave the United States two choices: the
United States either had to show cause why the representatives
of the PLO should not be denied entry into the country or issue them restrictive visas. 5' The United States, in accordance
with the court's order, issued the PLO representatives restrictive visas. 5 2 Although this dispute did not fall under the Headquarters Agreement's dispute settlement mechanism because
it was not between the United States and the United Nations, it
demonstrated that the United States accepted the presence of
the PLO due to the Headquarters Agreement. 53 In addition,
the U.S. court noted the obligation of the United States to permit even undesired aliens entrance into the country if the
alien's purpose involved official U.N. duties.5 4
Thus, the Headquarters Agreement not only explicitly defines the rights and duties of both the United Nations and the
United States, but over forty years of practice under the Agree1) Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work ...of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;
2) Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;
3) Considers that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations.

Id. (emphasis in original). See generally Suy; The Status of Observers in International Organizations, 160 RECUEIL DES COURs 75 (1978) (stating that observers from liberation
movements have been granted visas to enter host country under access clause's "invitees" category); Travers, The Legal Effect of United Nations Action in Support of the Palestine
Liberation Organization and the National Liberation Movements of Africa, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J.
561 (1976).
50. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Kissinger, No. 74 Civ. 1545
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1974), partially excerpted in A. ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN. INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1974).

51. Id. at 27-28. The Anti-Defamation League got an order directing the United
States to show why the PLO should not be denied entry, or as an alternative, to issue
a restrictive visa limiting PLO representatives to a 25-mile radius from Columbus
Circle in Manhattan. Id. The U.S. government decided to issue this restrictive visa
and, therefore, satisfied the court's demand. Id.
52. Id..
53. Record at 37, B'nai B'rith (No. 74 Civ. 1545). Originally the United States
was going to issue the PLO representatives a visa that would have permitted them to
travel throughout the United States. Id. at 4.
54. Id.at 37.
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ment has helped clarify how these rights and duties should be
interpreted. However, these clarifications of the Headquarters
Agreement were not extensive enough to resolve the subsequent dispute over the enactment of the ATA.
II. THE ATA, THE ICJ, AND THE U.S. COURT. THE
DISPUTE UNFOLDS

The ATA, which was incorporated into the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, 55 called
for the closing of PLO offices in the United States.56 The
United Nations claimed that the enactment of the ATA, without any assurance as to the Act's effect on the PLO Observer
Mission, created a dispute regarding the Headquarters Agreement's interpretation or application." The United Nations
then implemented section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement 58 and, following the refusal of the United States to select
its arbitrator,5 9 proceeded to the ICJ for an advisory opinion
on whether the Headquarters Agreement obligated the United
States to arbitrate. 6 ° Subsequently, the U.S. Attorney General,
pursuant to the ATA, brought suit in a U.S. court to close the
PLO Observer Mission. 6 '
A. The A TA: The Dispute Begins

In response to terrorist actions by the PLO, U.S. Senator
Charles E. Grassley introduced legislation to curtail PLO activity in the United States.62 This legislation prompted debate
.between Congress and the U.S. State Department about possi55. Pub. L. No. 100-204, tit. X, 101 Stat. 1331 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 52015203 (West Supp. 1989)).
56. See infra note 71 (for relevant text of ATA).
57. Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/42/915, para. 5 (1988) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report],
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 780, 781 (1988).
58. Id.; see infra note 76 and accompanying text.
59. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
60. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
61. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
62. 133 CONG. REC. S6447 (daily ed. May 14, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Grassley). "The action ... is not because of one so-called isolated incident of terrorist activity but because of the years of documented evidence that leaves one with no
doubt about the PLO's goals and what its methods are to achieve those goals." Id.
The specific PLO terrorist acts that Senator Grassley pointed to were as follows:
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ble conflicts with the Headquarters Agreement. 633 Some senators claimed that the United States had the right to close the
PLO Observer Mission to safeguard its own security. 64 Other
senators argued that observer missions were not protected
under the terms of the Headquarters Agreement.6 5 The State
Department sent a letter to Congress in which it stated that
closing the PLO Observer Mission would violate obligations
under the Headquarters Agreement.6 6 The U.N. SecretaryFirst.... [TIhe 1972 Black September massacre of 11 Olympic athletes-an American was among those killed.
Second. The 1973 murder of a 16-year-old American.
Third. The 1974 downing of a TWA 707 which resulted in the death of
88 people, some of whom were American.
Fourth. The 1975 bombings in Jerusalem which resulted in the death
of three Americans.
Fifth. The 1976 hotel fire set by the PLO which caused the death of two
Americans.
Sixth. The 1976 killing of an aide to Senator Jacob Javits.
Seventh. The 1978 killings of [an] American Medical Student and an
American photographer.
Eighth.... [Tihe massacres at the Rome and Athens airports, and the
murder of Leon Klinghoffer aboard the Achille Lauro.
Id. Nevertheless, at the end of 1988, the United States agreed to speak with the PLO
because it recognized Israel and renounced terrorism. See Statement of the Opening
of Diplomatic Talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization, 24 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1625 (Dec. 14, 1988).
63. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
64. 133 CONG. REC. S6449 (daily ed. May 14, 1987) (statement of Sen. Dole).
Regarding the Headquarters Agreement, Senator Dole stated: "In our agreement
with the United Nations, we have reserved our right to defend ourselves; to take any
actions necessitated by our national security; and to see that our national laws are
fully observed." Id.; see supra note 17 (text of this security provision).
65. 133 CONG. REC. HI 1425 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1987) (statement of Rep. Burton).
It is simply a lie that this bill violates the U.S. headquarters agreement
The U.N. headquarters agreement does not even contain the words
"observer mission." All observer missions exist under a clause pertaining to
"invitees" that was never intended to cover permanent offices or missions.
All U.N. observer missions remain in New York under the courtesy of the
United States and have no-zero-rights in the headquarters agreement.
Id.
66. 133 CONG. REC. S16605 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Grassley). Senator Grassley pointed to a letter he received in July, 1985, from Secretary of State George Schultz, which stated in part that "[t]his administration shares
the concerns evident in this legislation. We condemn, unequivocally, terrorist acts by
all groups, including acts associated with the PLO ....
[But] closure of the PLO
observer mission . . . would be seen as a violation of a U.S. treaty obligation under
the U.N. headquarters agreements." Id.
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General agreed with the State Department's assessment and
even sent a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations demanding that the U.S. State Department oppose the
legislation.67
In the end, the ATA was attached to the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act 68 without prior committee hearings 69 and
won approval on December 22, 1987.70 The ATA calls for the
closing of any PLO office located in the United States. 7 ' In
67. Id. Senator Grassley noted U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez De Cuellar's
letter to the U.S. Permanent Representative Ambassador Walters as an example of
U.N. pressure on the State Department to oppose the legislation. Id. The Secretary
General's letter stated:
I would trust, in the circumustances [sic], that the United States Government will continue to vigorously oppose any steps in the Congress to legislate against the Palestine Liberation Organization observer mission to the
United Nations. Since the legislation runs counter to obligations arising
from the headquarters agreement, I would like to underline the serious and
detrimental consequences that it would entail.

Id.
68. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L.
No. 100-204, tit. X, 101 Stat. 1331 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2651 (West Supp.
1989)). The purpose of this bill was to authorize 1988-89 appropriations for the
Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Board of International
Broadcasting. Id.
69. 133 CONG. REC. S13852-55 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (statement of Sen. Bingaman). Senator Bingaman objected to the absence of committee hearings because
he felt there were very serious issues that needed to be examined. Id. at S13852.
Senator Grassley responded that because 50 senators had co-sponsored the legislation, and the need to do something about PLO terrorism was immediate, the hearings would be an unnecessary delay. Id. at S 13853.
70. Pub. L. No. 100-204, tit. X, secs. 1002-1004, 101 Stat. 1331, 1406-07 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201-5203 (West Supp. 1989)).
71. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, sec. 1003, 22 U.S.C.A. § 5202 (West Supp.
1989). The relevant sections of the Act read:
Sec. 1002. FINDINGS; DETERMINATIONS.
(b) DETERMINATIONS.-Therefore, the Congress determines that the
PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization and a threat to the interests
of the United States, its allies, and to international law and should not benefit from operating in the United States. Sec. 1003. PROHIBITIONS REGARDING THE PLO.
It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of the
[PLO] ....
(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or
maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direction
of, or with funds provided by the [PLO] or any of its constituent groups, any
successor to any of those, or any agents thereof.
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addition, the Act states that it is to be applied irrespective of
any contrary laws.7 2 Prior to the enactment of the ATA, the
PLO operated an information office in Washington, D.C., but
this office was ordered closed on December 1, 1987, pursuant
73
to the Foreign Missions Act.
After the ATA's enactment, the U.S. representative to the
United Nations informed the Secretary-General that the U.S.
administration would consult with Congress to try to resolve
the conflicting obligations.7 ' But in mid-January, one month
after the enactment of the ATA, the United Nations still had no
U.S. response regarding the effect of the ATA on the PLO Observer Mission.7 5 Therefore, the United Nations invoked the
negotiation portion of the dispute settlement procedure and
asked the United States to negotiate a resolution to the dispute. 76 The United States, however, refused to negotiate formally, maintaining that no dispute had arisen because it had
not decided to attempt to close the PLO Observer Mission.7 7
Nevertheless, the United States and the United Nations did
hold a series of consultative meetings in an attempt to resolve
the issue. 78 The United Nations was dissatisfied with this U.S.
response and, therefore, selected an arbitrator in accordance
with the arbitration phase of the Headquarters Agreement's
dispute settlement procedure.7 9 The United States, however,
Id. secs. 1002(b), 1003(3), 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201(b), 5202 (West Supp. 1989).
72. Id. sec. 1003(3), 22 U.S.C.A. § 5202 (West Supp. 1989).
73. Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 4301-16 (Supp. V 1987); see Palestine
Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding State Department closure of Palestine Information Office pursuant to Foreign Missions Act).
74. Secretary-GeneralsReport, supra note 57, para. 4, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 781.

75. Id. para. 5, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 781. The Secretary-General's report
stated that "[t]he assurance sought [by the United Nations] . . . had not been forthcoming .
I..."
Id.
76. Id. This report states that on January 14, 1988 the Secretary-General invoked section 21. Id.; see Headquarters Agreement, supra note i, sec. 21, 61 Stat. at
764, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, at 18, 11 U.N.T.S. at 30.
77. Secretary-Generals Report, supra note 57, para. 6, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 781.
78. Id.
79. Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/42/915/Add. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Secretary-General's

Report, Addendum 1], reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 783 (1988). This report states that on February I1, 1988, the United Nations informed the United States of its selection of Mr.
Eduardo Jim~nez de Archaga, former President and Judge of the International
Court of Justice, as the United Nation's arbitrator, and urged the United States to
make its choice. Id. para. 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 783.
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remained silent, refusing to appoint its arbitrator.8 0 As a result, the United Nations adopted two resolutions in support of
the Secretary-General,"' including a request for an ICJ advisory opinion on the question of whether a situation had developed that obligated the United States to arbitrate the dispute. 2
U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese subsequently informed the PLO Observer Mission that the United States
would take the necessary steps to effectuate its closing 8 3
80. Id. As of the date of this report (Feb. 25, 1988), the United States had not
communicated with the Secretary General regarding the selection of its arbitrator.

Id. Subsequently, the Committee on Relations with the Host Country reported that
the United States had still not chosen an arbitrator. Report of the Committee on Relations
with the Host Country: Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum, U.N. Doc.
A/42/915/Add.2, para. 2 (1988) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report, Addendum 2],

reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 784, 785 (1988).
81. Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country, G.A. Res. 42/229A &

42/229B, U.N. Doc. A/Res/42/229, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 772 (1988). Resolution
42/229A was adopted by a vote of 143 in favor and one against (Israel), and Resolution 42/229B was adopted by a vote of 143 in favor and none against, the United
States not participating. United Nations General Assembly: Resolutions Concerning Controversy, 27 I.L.M. 770 (1988); see Secretary-Generals Report, Addendum 2, supra note 80,
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 784.
82. Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country, G.A. Res. 42/229B,

U.N. Doc. A/Res/42/229, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 773 (1988). In this resolution, the
United Nations asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the following question:
In the light of facts reflected in the reports of the Secretary-General, 1/ is
the United States of America, as a party to the Agreement between the
United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, 2/ under an obligation to enter into arbitration
in accordance with section 21 of the Agreement?
Id., reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 775. The United States had, prior to this dispute, unilater-

ally altered its consent to jurisdiction from the ICJ Statute because of an earlier dispute in which the ICJ agreed to give jurisdiction to Nicaragua. See Letter from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to the U.N. Secretary-General (Oct. 7, 1985) (announcing termination of U.S. acceptance of ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction), reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 1742 (1985); see also Glennon, ConstitutionalIssues in Tervninating U.S. Acceptance
of Compulsory Jurisdiction, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS
447 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987).
83. Letter from Attorney General Edwin Meese to the Permanent Observer Mission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations (Mar. 11, 1988),
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 787 (1988). Attorney General Edwin Meese stated that, in accordance with the ATA,
as of March 21, 1988, maintaining the PLO Observer Mission to the United
Nations in the United States will be unlawful.
The legislation charges the Attorney General with the responsibility of
enforcing the Act. To that end, please be advised that ... the Department
of Justice will forthwith take action in United States federal court to insure
your compliance.
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Thereafter, on March 22, 1988, the day after the effective date
of the ATA, the Attorney General initiated a lawsuit in a U.S.
court requesting an injunction to close the PLO Observer Mission. 84 After the proceedings in the U.S. court had begun, the
ICJ issued an advisory opinion that called for the United States
to select its arbitrator. 5 Nevertheless, the United States refused to appoint an arbitrator and continued to seek the closure of the PLO Observer Mission in the U.S. court.8 6
B. ICJ Advisory Opinion: A Dispute is Defined
In its advisory opinion, the ICJ conducted a step-by-step
analysis to determine whether the situation had risen to a level
that obligated the United States to arbitrate. 7 First, the ICJ
determined that a dispute existed between the United States
and the United Nations. 8 Second, the ICJ noted that the dispute concerned the application of the Headquarters Agreement within the meaning of section 21.89 Finally, the ICJ deId.; see also Letter from Herbert S. Okun, the Acting Permanent Representative of the
United States to the United Nations, addressed to the United Nations Secretary-General (Mar. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Okun Letter], reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 786 (1988). In
this letter, Ambassador Okun stated that
the [U.S.] Attorney General . . . has determined that he is required by the
[ATA] . . . to close the office of the [PLO's] . . . Observer Mission to the
United Nations . . . irrespective of any obligations the United States may have under
the Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations. If the PLO does not comply with the Act, the
Attorney General will initiate legal action to close the PLO Observer Mission on or about March 21, 1988, the effective date of the Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
84. See Complaint filed by U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese, United States v.
Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (No. 88 Civ. 1962)
[hereinafter Complaint], reprinted in 27 1.L.M. 790 (1988).
85. See Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the
United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26June 1947 (U.N. v. U.S.), 1988 I.C.J.
12 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 808 (1988).
86. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
87. See Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 26-34, paras. 33-56,
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 815-19. The ICJ distinguished this question from the question as to the actual conflict between the Headquarters Agreement and the ATA,
which it was not called upon to decide. Id. at 26, para. 33, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at
815.
88. Id. at 27-30, paras. 34-43, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 816-17; see infra notes 91128 and accompanying text.
89. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 30-32, paras. 45-50, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 817-18; see infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
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termined that sufficient negotiations had taken place in accordance with section 21 and that the parties had not agreed to
settle the dispute through a means other than arbitration.90
In the first step of its analysis, the ICJ defined a dispute as
a legal disagreement or conflict of interest, 9 ' a definition that
relied on a decision by the Permanent Court of International
Justice (the "PCIJ"), the ICJ's predecessor.9 2 In that case,
Greece, which had taken up the cause of one of its citizens,93
claimed that the British authorities in Palestine had denied certain public works concessions to a Greek national.9 4 As a result, Greece alleged that the British were under an international obligation to indemnify that national. 9 5 The PCIJ found
that a dispute existed between Greece and Britain, because the
countries disagreed on whether there was a legal obligation to
indemnify this Greek subject.9 6
In subsequent cases, the ICJ has applied and clarified this
PCIJ definition of dispute. For instance, in Interpretationof Peace
90. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 32-34, paras. 51-56, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 818-19; see infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
91. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 27, para. 35, reprinted in
27 I.L.M. at 816.
92. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 2, at 6 (Aug. 30). The exact definition the PCIJ used was: "A dispute is a
disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons." Id. at 11. The Permanent Court of International Justice (the
"PCIJ") was established when the League of Nations adopted the Statute of the
Court, Dec. 13, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 380. See generally G. ELIAN, supra note 6, at 31 (discussing the establishment of the PCIJ).
93. Mavrommatis, 1924 P.C.I.J. at 12. The dispute over the Palestine concessions, granted by the Turkish authorities before defeat in the desert war in 1917, was
initially between M. Mavrommatis, a Greek national, and Great Britain. Id. Great
Britain had succeeded to the administration of the former Turkish territories under a
League of Nations mandate. See Q WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 600 (1969) (text of Palestine mandate to Great Britain). Eventually the Greek
government took up the cause of its citizen, and it then became a dispute between
two countries and, as such, entered into the domain of international law and the
jurisdiction of the PCIJ. Id.
94. Id. at 7. The Greek government claimed that the authorities in Palestine and
Great Britain refused to recognize the contractual rights acquired by M. Mavrommatis, under an agreement he made with the Ottoman authorities regarding public
works concessions to be constructed in Palestine. Id. at 7-8.
95. Id. at 7.
96. Id. at 12. The court stated: "The fact that Great Britain and Greece are the
opposing Parties to the dispute arising out of the Mavrommatis concessions is sufficient to make it a dispute between two States within the meaning of Article 26 of the
Palestine Mandate." Id.
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Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,9 7 the ICJ held that
an international dispute had arisen involving opposing views
on whether these three countries had committed human rights
abuses in violation of certain treaty obligations. 98 In that case,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania contended that no dispute
existed because the accusations were false and that there was
thus no duty to arbitrate in accordance with the treaties.9 9 The
United States argued that these countries had no grounds to
declare unilaterally that a dispute did not exist, and further, it
argued that the countries' refusal to comply with the dispute
settlement clause constituted a serious breach of treaty obligations. I 00 Furthermore, the United States claimed that the refusal of these countries to join in the established mode of settlement could be seen only as a deliberate violation of international obligations and a lack of good faith:' 0 ' The ICJ agreed
with the United States, emphasizing that one side's denial of
the existence of the dispute was not proof of its non-exist02
ence. 1
Similarly, in South West Africa,' 0 3 the ICJ noted the earlier
PCIJ definition of dispute, 0 4 and then it stated that a dispute
could exist only when one party directly opposed the claims of
the other.'0 5 In this case, Liberia and Ethiopia claimed that
97. (U.N. v. Bulg., Hung., & Rom.), 1950 I.C.J. 65 (Advisory Opinion of Mar.

30).
98. Id. at 74. The parties to the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Romania accused these three countries, through the United Nations, of violating the

treaties based on alleged human rights violations. Id. The United States was a party
to these peace treaties. Id.
99. Id. at 67, 74. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania denied the accusations and
refused to appoint an arbitrator in accord with the treaties' dispute settlement procedures. Id. The United Nations subsequently asked the ICJ for this advisory opinion,
submitting the questions of whether a dispute subject to the settlement provisions
contained in the treaties had arisen and, if so, if Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania
were obligated to appoint an arbitrator. Id. at 73, 75.
100. Letters from the United States (U.N. v. Bulg., Hung., & Rom.), 1950 1.C.J.
Pleadings 66-68 (Sept. 19, 1949).

101. Id.
102. Interpretation of Peace Treaties, 1950 I.C.J. at 74.
103. (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1962 1.C.J. 319 (Preliminary Objections of Dec. 21).
104. Id. at 328. The court cited the definition used in Mavrommatis Palestine

Concessions (Greece v. Gr.Brit.), 1924 P.C.1.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 6 (Aug. 30); see supra
note 92 (text of the definition).
105. South West Africa, 1962 I.C.J. at 328. The court stated that "[i]t must be
shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other." Id.
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South Africa had violated treaty obligations by practicing
apartheid in South West Africa.' 0 6 South Africa, for its part,
0 7
claimed no dispute existed concerning its treaty obligations.
The ICJ noted that the mere assertion or denial of the existence of a dispute does not make it so.' °0 Thus, in South West
Africa, the court found that a dispute existed, because Ethiopia
and Liberia held one view of the applicable treaty, while South
Africa held a directly opposing view.' 0 9
Applying this case law to the United States and United Nations dispute submitted to the ICJ by the United Nations, the
ICJ held that the United States and the United Nations directly
opposed each others' claims." ° The United Nations claimed
that the enactment of the ATA, without an assurance by the
United States that the PLO Observer Mission would not be
closed, violated the Headquarters Agreement."' The United
States claimed that the ATA was not a violation of the Headquarters Agreement, especially in light of its assurance that it
would not take any action against the PLO until the U.S. court
made its decision.'
Further, the United States said that it
would implement the ATA irrespective of its obligations under
the Headquarters Agreement.' '3 Therefore, the ICJ saw the
106. Id. at 323. The treaty at issue in the case was the Mandate for German
South-West Africa, Dec. 17, 1920, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 89 (1921), reprinted in 17
AM.J. INT'L L. 175 (Supp. 1923).
107. South West Africa, 1962 I.CJ. at 327.
108. Id. at 328. The court stated that "it is not sufficient for one party to a
contentious case to assert that a dispute exists with the other party. A mere assertion
is not sufficient to prove the existence of a dispute any more than a mere denial of the
existence of the dispute proves its non-existence." Id.
109. Id. at 321-22, 328. The treaty in the case was a mandate, whereby in 1920,
the government of South Africa was, by this mandate, given administrative responsibility over the territory of South West Africa. Id. at 322. Ethiopia and Liberia, as
members of the United Nations, brought this suit in accordance with the mandate's
dispute settlement procedure, claiming that South Africa's practice of apartheid in
these territories violated the mandate. Id. at 322-23, 367.
110. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26June 1947 (U.N. v. U.S.), 1988 1.CJ. 12, 30,
para. 43 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 808, 817 (1988). The
court stated that it was "obliged to find that the opposing attitudes of the United
Nations and the United States show the existence of a dispute between the two parties to the Headquarters Agreement." Id.
111. Id. para. 16, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 812 (quoting Letter from U.N. Secretary-General to U.S. Ambassador Walters (Jan. 14, 1988)).
112. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
113. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 22-23, para. 24, re-
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disagreement between the United States and the United Nations about whether the enactment of the ATA violated the
Headquarters Agreement as viewpoints that clearly opposed
one another." 4
The ICJ noted that the U.S. refusal to appear and to ad-

vance an argument to justify its conduct under international
law did not prevent the ICJ from finding the existence of an
international dispute." 5 To support this position, the ICJ referred to The United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. '" 6 In that case, the court found the existence of an international dispute between Iran and the United States even
though Iran did not take part in any U.N. debates regarding
the situation, engage in prior discussions with the United
States, 1 7 or advance an argument at the ICJ.'" The ICJ saw
no need to inquire into the attitude of Iran in order to rule that
a dispute existed, because the claims involved a dispute regarding the interpretation or application of the conventions." 9
Similarly, in the present case, the ICJ recognized that a dispute
could exist even though the United States refused to submit its
printed in 27 I.L.M. at 813-14 (quoting Okun Letter, supra note 83, reprinted in 27

I.L.M. at 786).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 28-29, para. 38, reprintedin 27 I.L.M. at 816-17. The court stated that,

in its view,
where one party to a treaty protests against the behavior or a decision of
another party, and claims that such behavior or decision constitutes a breach
of the treaty, the mere fact that the party accused does not advance any
argument tojustify its conduct under international law does not prevent the
opposing attitudes of the parties from giving rise to a dispute concerning
the interpretation or application of the treaty.
Id.
116. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24). In U.S. Staff in Tehran, when Iranians occupied the
U.S. Embassy and held U.S. personnel as hostages, the United States claimed that
Iran violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. 6820, 596
U.N.T.S. 262. U.S. Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. at 6.
117. U.S. Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. at 25, para. 47.
118. Id. at 22-23, paras. 41-42.
119. Id. at 25, para. 47. The court determined that the dispute fell within the
scope of article I of both Conventions. Id. Article I stated: "Disputes arising out of
the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory
jurisdiction of the [ICJ] and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an ap-

plication made by any party to the dispute being a party to the present Protocol." Id.
at 24, para. 41.
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views on the matter to the ICJ, 120 and even though it took the
12
position that no dispute existed. '
In addition, the ICJ dismissed the U.S. assertions that a
dispute would not exist until the PLO Observer Mission was
actually closed and that the United States would not take any
action to close the PLO Observer Mission until after the U.S.
court ruled on the issue. 12 2 The court explained that it would
not allow this unilateral U.S. position to prevail over pre-existing multilateral obligations, 2 and that the existence of a
dispute does not require a contested decision by one side to be
carried into effect. 12 4 The court added that a dispute can still
arise even if a party promises to wait until its domestic court
25
rules on the present conflict.
The ICJ described the claim made by the United Nations
under the Headquarters Agreement, without any counterclaim
made by the United States, as just the type of situation that
would give rise to the Headquarters Agreement's arbitration
procedure.'26 The court added that prior recourse by the
United States in its domestic courts would violate both the let120. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26June 1947 (U.N. v. U.S.), 1988 I.CJ. 12, 29,
para. 39 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 808, 817 (1988). The
ICJ cited a letter from the U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands to the ICJ, which
stated that the United States declined to submit its views to the ICJ because, as long
as the matter was pending in the U.S. court, it did not believe that arbitration was
appropriate or timely. Id. Letter from John Shad, U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands, to the Honorable Eduardo Valencia-Ospina of the International Court ofJustice (Mar. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Shad Letter], reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 806 (1988).
121. Shad Letter, supra note 120, reprintedin 27 I.L.M. at 806. This U.S. position
was pointed out in a report of the Secretary-General. Secretary-General'sReport, supra
note 57, para. 6, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 781. The report stated that "the United
States . . . had not concluded that a dispute existed . . . because the legislation in

question had not yet been implemented." Id.
122. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 29-30, paras. 39-42,
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 817.
123. Id. at 29, para. 40, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 817. Here the court stated that it
would "not allow considerations as to what might be 'appropriate' to prevail over the
obligations which derive from section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement, as 'the
Court, being a Court ofjustice, cannot disregard rights recognized by it, and base its
decision on considerations of pure expediency .... .'" Id. (quoting Free Zones of
Upper Savoy and the District ofGex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 24, at 15
(Order of Dec. 6)).
124. Id. at 29-30, para. 42, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 817.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 29, para. 41, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 817. "The purpose of the arbitration procedure envisaged by . . . [the Headquarters] Agreement is precisely the
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ter and the spirit of the Headquarters Agreement, because the
Agreement's dispute settlement provision did not call for the
exhaustion of local remedies prior to its application. 127 Therefore, the ICJ concluded that the actions taken by both the U.S.
Attorney General in seeking to close the PLO Observer Mission and the Secretary-General in challenging this action
28
clearly rose to the level of dispute as defined by past courts.
The ICJ then entered the second step of its analysis, and
examined whether the dispute, in accordance with section 21,
concerned the interpretation or application of the Headquarters Agreement.' 29 The court noted that both the United
States and the United Nations considered the PLO to be covered by the Headquarters Agreement's access clause, because
30
the United Nations had invited the PLO as an observer.
Therefore, the ICJ determined that there was no dispute as to
the Headquarters Agreement's interpretation.
The ICJ
held, however, that there was a dispute as to the Headquarters
Agreement's application, because the United States claimed
that it acted irrespective of any obligations under the Headquarters Agreement. 32 In addition, the ICJ held that whether
or not the ATA had been implemented was not determinative,
because the Headquarters Agreement's dispute settlement
clause was meant to apply to any dispute that
"concerned" the
33
application.
or
interpretation
agreement's
The final phase of the ICJ's analysis was to examine if the
parties had attempted to settle the dispute by negotiation or
settlement of such disputes as may arise between the Organization and the host
country without any prior recourse to municipal courts .
Id.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 30, para. 43, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 817.
Id. at 30-32, paras. 45-49, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 817-18.
Id. paras. 46-47; see supra note 49.
131. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 i.C.J. at 32, para. 48, reprintedin
27 I.L.M. at 818.
132. Id. at 32, para. 49; see Okun Letter, supra note 83, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at
786.
133. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 32, para. 50, reprinted in
27 I.L.M. at 818. The court stated that whether or not the ATA is applied and the
PLO Observer Mission is actually closed is "not decisive as regards section 21 of the
Headquarters Agreement, which refers to any dispute 'concerning the interpretation
or application' of the Agreement, and not concerning the application of the measures
taken in the municipal law of the United States." Id.
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had agreed to some other settlement procedure.' 34 The U.N.
Secretary-General interpreted the Headquarters Agreement's
dispute settlement procedure as a two-stage process. 135 In the
first stage, the parties should attempt to settle the dispute
through negotiation or some other mode, and .in the second6
stage, the parties should submit to compulsory arbitration.1
Therefore, the court pointed to the U.N. Secretary-General's
letter to the United States in which he invoked the negotiation
stage. 13 7 Subsequently, in early 1988, the parties held a series
of unsuccessful consultations.13 8 While the United States did
not consider these consultations to be negotiations within the
framework of section 21,131 the ICJ saw these meetings as fulfilling the negotiation requirement, because the U.S. refusal to
work within the framework of section 21 served as a clear indication that the dispute could not be settled by negotiation." 0
134. Id. at 32-34, paras. 51-56, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 818-19.
135. Id. at 32-33, para. 52, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 8 18-19 (quoting Letter from
the U.N. Secretary-General to U.S. Ambassador Walters (Jan. 14, 1988)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 33, para. 53, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 819.
138. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 57, paras. 6-10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at
781-82. This report states that
[b]eginning on 7 January 1988, a series of consultations were held ....
The Secretary-General learned on 10 February 1988 that the United
States Administration ha[d] not made its decision with respect to the PLO
Observer Mission ....[H]aving regard to the time constraints ... a stage in
the negotiations . . .has been reached where . . .[the Secretary-General]
must inform the General Assembly in accordance with the terms of resolution 42/210 B of 17 December 1987.
Id. In an addendum to that report, the U.N. Secretary-General stated:
Since the previous report of ...10 February 1988, there have been no substantive developments . . .[and] the Legal Counsel of the United Nations
was advised unofficially that there would be a high~level meeting in Washington on 18 February 1988 to consider the question. On 18 February
1988, however, the Legal Counsel was informed orally by the State Department Legal Advisor that a decision had still not been taken by the United
States Government .... There have been no further communications ...
since that date.
U.N. Doc. A/42/915/Add.1, para. 1,reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 783 (1988).
139. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 33, para. 54, reprintedin
27 I.L.M. at 819 (U.N. Secretary-General's written statement regarding U.S. position).
140. Id. at 33-34, para. 55, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 819. The ICJ cited Mavrorninatis Palestine Concessions as stating that if the parties reach a point where one refuses
to give way, there can be no doubt that the dispute cannot then be settled by negotiation. Id. (citing Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, (Greece v. U.K.) 1924 P.C.Ij.
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In addition, the ICJ determined that the United States and
the United Nations had not agreed to another mode of settlement. "4 ' The ICJ observed that the U.S. court proceeding did
not fall within this category, because it was initiated by the
United States to enforce the ATA, rather than to settle a dispute with the United Nations. 42 Moreover, the United Nations entered the U.S. proceedings as amicus curiae, not as a
party, to avoid the appearance that it consented to resolving
143
the dispute in the U.S. court.
In response to the U.S. position that its actions against the
PLO Observer Mission were taken regardless of any Headquarters Agreement conflicts, 14 4 the ICJ cited the principle
that international law prevails over domestic law.' 4 5 The court
(ser. A) No. 2, at 13 (Judgment of Aug. 30)). The ICJ also quoted United States Staffin
Tehran, which stated:
When the United States filed its Application [to the ICJ] . . . its attempts to
negotiate with Iran in regard to the overrunning of its Embassy and detention of its nationals as hostages had reached a deadlock, owing to the refusal
of the Iranian Government to enter into any discussion of the matter. In
consequence, there existed at that date not only a dispute but, beyond any
doubt, a "dispute . . . not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy" ....
Id. (quoting United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. at 21, para. 51 (Judgment of May 24)).
141. Id. at 34, para. 56, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 819.
142. Id. The U.S. court gave the same explanation as its justification for agreeing to decide the issue before it. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695
F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The U.S. court stated that "[b]ecause these
proceedings are not in any way directed to settling any dispute, ripe or not, between
the United Nations and the United States, Section 21, is, by its terms, inapplicable."
Id.
143. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 34, para. 56, reprinted in
27 I.L.M. at 819. The U.N.'s memorandum of law submitted to the U.S. court stated
that its submission "should not be construed in any way as a motion on the part of
the United Nations to intervene or otherwise appear as a party to this action." Amicus Curiae Memoranda of Law and Appendices Submitted by and on Behalf of the
United Nations at Preliminary Statement, United States v. Palestine Liberation Org.,
695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (No. 88 Civ. 1962) [hereinafter U.N. Memorandum]. The United Nations also stated that "[tihe amicus appearance by [it] before
[the U.S. court] cannot be construed in any way as a tacit agreement.., to a mode of
settlement other than arbitration under Section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement."
Id. at 40.
144. Okun Letter, supra note 83, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 786.
145. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate, 1988 I.C.J. at 34-35, para. 57, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 819-20. Judge Oda voted in favor of the advisory opinion. He
stated in a separate opinion, however, that the issue of international law's priority in
these circumstances would have better helped to solve the problem. Id. at 41, para.
10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 823. But he noted that, although the court asserted this
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stated that even if the U.S. position was intended to encompass
both the substantive obligations of the access clause and the
procedural obligations of section 21, the principle of international law prevailing over domestic law would sufficiently negate it."' The court noted that in an arbitral proceeding over
one hundred years ago and in a PCIJ case, this principle had
been recognized.' 4 7 First, in the Alabama arbitration, 14 8 involving the first major international arbitral tribunal,' 4 9 the United
States demanded compensation from Great Britain for nonneutral acts committed during the Civil War.' 5 ° The United
States argued, as a general principle of law, that the international duties of a country are independent of its own municipal
law, and that such municipal laws do not rise to the height of
the law of nations or of a particular treaty obligation."15
Second, in Greco-Bulgarian "Communities, "152 the PCIJ rendered an advisory opinion at the request of a mixed GreekBulgarian Commission, based on questions raised by the Commission and the Greek and Bulgarian governments regarding
the interpretation of a convention between the two governments.' 53 The Greek government asked the court whether the
convention in question or internal law would prevail if a conflict arose between the two.' 54 The PCIJ responded that an
priority, it did not hear or consider arguments on this point because it was not the
issue that it was requested by the United Nations to address. Id.
146. Id. at 34-35, para. 57, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 819-20.
147. Id., reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 819-20.
148. This arbitration took place pursuant to the Treaty Between the United
States and Great Britain (Treaty of Washington), May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863, 7 Bevans
170, 1 Malloy 700, resolving all the disagreements between these two countries. One
such disagreement, known as the Alabama claims, involved the claim of the United
States that Great Britain built and aided Confederate warships, the most destructive
being the Alabama, during the Civil War, and that such actions violated international
law according to the treaty. Three arbitrators eventually determined that Great Britain was liable to the United States for an amount exceeding US$15 million. The
Alabama Claims Arbitration Between Great Britain and the United States, I Malloy
717 (award of Sept. 14, 1872).
149. See A. CooK, THE ALABAMA CLAIMS-AMERICAN POLITICS AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1865-1872, at 9 (1975).
150. ALABAMA CLAIMS, ARGUMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES,

DELIVERED TO THE

TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION AT GENEVA 5-25 (June 15, 1872); see also A. CooK, supra

note 149, at 9.

151.

ALABAMA CLAIMS,

supra note 150, at 33.

152. (Gr.v. BuIg.), 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17 (July 31).
153. Id. at 4-5.
154. Id. at 7. One question, drawn up by the Greek government, stated: "If the
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international convention should prevail over the internal laws
of either side because of the generally accepted principle that
provisions of local law do not prevail over those of a treaty. 155
Likewise, the ICJ stated that the U.S. claim that it would implement the ATA irrespective of its international obligations
under the Headquarters Agreement violated the principle of
international law prevailing over domestic law.' 5 6 In concluding, the ICJ held that a dispute concerning the application of
the Headquarters Agreement had arisen, and that the United
States was required to select its arbitrator under the
Head57
quarters Agreement's dispute settlement procedure.
C. The U.S. Court's Opinion: The Dispute Ends-or Does It?
The U.S. Attorney General initiated proceedings in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to
enjoin the operations of and to close permanently the PLO
Observer Mission. 5 The United States claimed in a memorandum to the U.S. court that the ATA required the closing of
the PLO Observer Mission for two reasons. First, the United
States claimed that Congress clearly intended for the Act to be
applied to the PLO Observer Mission notwithstanding any
contrary laws. 1 59 Second, the United States argued that under
U.S. law, when a statute and a treaty conflict, the last in time
prevails.' 60 Thus, the United States claimed that since the
ATA was passed forty years after the Headquarters Agreement, that it should supersede the Agreement.' 6 ' Therefore,
application of the Convention of Neuilly is at variance with a provision of internal law
in force in the territory of one of the two signatory Powers, which of the conflicting
provisions should be preferred-that of the law or that of the Convention?" Id.
155. Id. at 32.
156. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26June 1947 (U.N. v. U.S.), 1988 I.C.J. 12, 3435, para. 57 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 819-20 (1988)
(quoting Greco-Bulgarian "Communities," 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17 at 32 (July
31)).
157. Id. para. 58, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 820.
158. See Complaint, supra note 84.
159. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for SummaryJudgment at 8-13, United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (No. 88 Civ. 1962) (United States arguing that "[tihere can be no question that
the Act on its face requires the closing of the Observer Mission").'
160. Id. at 15-16.
161. Id.
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the United States concluded that the ATA directed it to close
1 62
the PLO Observer Mission.
On the other hand, the PLO, along with the United Nations and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York as
amici, argued that the U.S. court should stay the proceedings
163
until the arbitration phase of section 21 could be completed.
In addition, the PLO argued that the ATA did not apply to the
PLO Observer Mission, because neither the Act nor its legislative history indicated an intent to violate the Headquarters
Agreement. 164
The U.S. court determined that U.S. law required it to interpret the Act in light of the international agreement and to
give effect to both if possible. 165 But the court disagreed with
the defendant's argument
that it was required to submit the
66
matter to arbitration. 1

The U.S. court determined that it was not required to stay
its proceeding prior to the Headquarters Agreement's arbitration proceeding for several reasons. 167 First, the court looked
to the express language in section 21, emphasizing its reference only to disputes between the United States and the
United Nations. 168 This led the court to conclude that because
the United Nations was an amicus curiae in the proceeding,
rather than a named party, section 21 should not be applied to
69

its proceedings. 1

162. Id. at 39.
163. The Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, United
States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (No. 88 Civ.
1962) [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum]; U.N. Memorandum, supra, note 143,
at 41; Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
164. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 163, at 4-3 1.
165. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). The court stated that "[u]nder our constitutional system, statutes
and treaties are both the supreme law of the land, and the Constitution sets forth no
order of precedence to differentiate between them .... Whenever possible, both are
to be given effect." Id.
166. Id. at 1464. The court did not agree with either the defendants' or amici's
positions, stating that "it is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by Section 21
of the Headquarters Agreement and that any interpretation of the Headquarters
Agreement incident to an interpretation of the ATA must be done by the court." Id.
167. Id. at 1462-64.
168. Id., 695 F. Supp. at 1462; see supra note 19 (text of section 21).
169. United States v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1462; see supra notes 142-43.
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Next, the court explained that it would exceed its powers
under article III of the U.S. Constitution if it abided by section
21 every time one of its decisions involved an interpretation of
the Headquarters Agreement. 70 The court found that the executive branch made a discretionary foreign affairs decision
not to arbitrate, and therefore, the political question doctrine
called for it to defer to that branch's decision.' 7' As support,
the court cited to a long line of Supreme Court cases, going
back to Marbury v. Madison, 172 where the Supreme Court stated
it should not impede upon the discretionary duties of the executive or of the executive officers. 7 3 The court also referred to
Baker v. Carr,'V4 where the Supreme Court held that questions
relating to foreign relations were typically political questions,
which defy judicial involvement. 7 The Court in Baker defined
the elements found in questions that would make them polit76
ical.'
170. United States v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1462. The U.S. Constitution Article
III states:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish ....
Section 2. [1] The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority ....
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; see infra note 173 (noting Supreme Court's interpretation
of a court's Article III powers).
171. United States v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1463. "Resolution of the question
whether the United States will arbitrate requires 'an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.' " Id. at 1463 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)).
172. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
173. Id. at 170.
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court.
United States v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1462 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
174. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
175. Id.at 211.
176. Id.at 217.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
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In the present case, the court applied two of these elements. 1 77 First, the court held that it could not order the
United States to arbitrate after an executive decision not to,
because this would show a lack of respect for the executive
branch. 7 8 Second, the court held that such a decision would
lead to a clear embarrassment due to various branches answering this one question on arbitration in different ways. 179 Thus,
the court determined that the executive branch's initial decision not to arbitrate was one in which the court could not exer°
cise its discretion. 1
The court further noted the Supreme Court's historical
support for the view that the U.S. executive makes the ultimate
decision regarding how the United States should honor its
treaty obligations. 1"" For instance, in 1979, the Supreme
Court dismissed a suit brought by individual members of Congress to enjoin President Carter from terminating a treaty
without Congressional approval. 8 2 In 1947, the Supreme
Court noted that the President and the Senate could terminate
treaties. 1 3 In 1918, the Supreme Court held that a U.S. court
could not decide whether a Mexican general violated a treaty
by confiscating leather goods, because the U.S. Constitution
commits the conduct of foreign affairs to the executive and legtion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government;
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
177. United States v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1463.
178. Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
179. Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
180. Id.
181. Id. "[Tlhe ultimate decision as to how the United States should honor its
treaty obligations with the international community is one which has, for at least one
hundred years, been left to the executive to decide." Id. (citing Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 996-97 (1979)).
182. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
183. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 509 (1947). In Clark, a California resident
died and left property to German residents. Id. at 505. At the time, the United States
and Germany were at war and article IV of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Consular Rights with Germany, Dec. 8, 1923, United States-Germany, 44 Stat. 2132,
was at issue. The Court stated: " 'It is not for [the courts] to denounce treaties generally, en bloc. Their part it is ...

to determine whether ...

the provision is inconsis-

tent with the policy or safety of the nation .... ." Id. at 509 (quoting Techt v.
Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 242-43, 128 N.E. 185, 192 (1920)).
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islative branches." 4 There, the Court stated that the plaintiff's
remedy could be found either in the courts of Mexico or in the
political branches of the U.S. government.' 8 5 Finally, in 1889,
the Court barred a Chinese laborer from re-entering the
United States in accordance with an act of Congress.' 8 6 The
Court held that it was not a judicial function to determine
whether the act was valid in so far as it abrogated previous

treaty stipulations. 187
However, the court in United States v. PalestineLiberation Organization also realized that the political question doctrine does
not prevent a court from interpreting both an international
agreement and a domestic statute, even if that interpretation
has political repercussions.'8 8 To support this seemingly inconsistent principle, the court cited to Japan Whaling Association
v. American Cetacean Society,' 8 9 where the Supreme Court ruled
against a Japanese petitioner's contention that its action was a
political question not suitable forjudicial review. 9 0 The Court
stated that because the case involved the interpretation of a
statute, it was mandated to hear it even if the decision would
have significant political overtones.' 9 ' Similarly, the court in
184. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). "The conduct of foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive
and the Legislature-'the Political'-Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision." Id. at 302. The treaty allegedly violated in the case was
the Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting Laws of War on Land, Oct. 10, 1908, 36
U.S.T. 860, T.S. No. 9. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 209.
185. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 304.
186. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Cases), 130 U.S.
581 (1889) (Chinese laborer refused re-entry into United States pursuant to Act of
Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504).
187. Id. "The question whether our government is justified in disregarding its
engagements with another nation is not one for the determination of the courts ....
This Court is not a censor of the morals of other departments of the government; it is
not invested with any authority to pass judgment upon the motives of their conduct."
Id. at 602-03.
188. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1463 n.22
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
189. Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221
(1986)).
190. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986).
191. Id. at 229-30.
[T]he courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements, and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation
is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts ... [U]nder the Con-

1989]

U.N. HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT

781

United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization held that it was
mandated to hear the matter, since the controversy involved
92
the interpretation of the ATA.1
Finally, the court reasoned that to interpret section 21 as
decisive would raise serious constitutional questions. 9 3 The
94
court cited as support NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,'
where the Supreme Court declined to interpret the NLRB Act
as giving the NLRB jurisdiction to represent lay teachers in
religious schools, because such an interpretation would give
rise to serious constitutional issues involving the Establishment Clause.' 9 5 Likewise, in United States v. Palestine Liberation
Organization, the court held that giving an arbitral panel jurisdiction would be a repudiation of its constitutional duty to interpret the ATA to resolve the controversy before it.' 9 6
In concluding, the U.S. court determined that for the reasons noted above, it would not postpone its proceedings for
the sake of the Headquarters Agreement. 19 7 The court, however, in its final holding, determined that the Headquarters
Agreement was a valid treaty in force, and therefore the court
did not grant the injunction to close the PLO Observer Mission.' 9"8 Instead, the court based its decision on the U.S. law
requirement that calls for Congressional acts to be read in
light of prior international agreements if possible."' In addistitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes,
and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may
have significant political overtones. We conclude, therefore, that the present cases presents a justiciable controversy ....
Id. at 230.
192. See United States v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1464.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)).
195. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979).
196. See United States v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1464.

197. Id.
198. Id. at 36.
The Anti-Terrorism Act does not require the closure of the PLO Permanent
Observer Mission .... The PLO Mission to the United Nations is an invitee
of the United Nations under the Headquarters Agreement and its status is
protected by that agreement. The Headquarters Agreement remains a valid
and outstanding treaty obligation of the United States. It has not been
superceded [sic] by the Anti-Terrorism Act, which is a valid enactment of
general application.

Id.
199. Id. at 27. The court stressed "[tlhe lengths to which our courts have some-

782 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 12:751
tion, the court did not see the ATA provision calling for implementation irrespective of any -contrary law to apply to this
treaty, because when Congress meant to overrule treaties, it

explicitly did

so.

2 0 0

The U.S. Justice Department did not ap-

peal the district court decision.20 '

III. AN ARGUMENT FOR U.S. COMPLIANCE
IN THE FUTURE
There are several reasons why the United States should
abide by the Headquarters Agreement's arbitration clause in
the future. First, until Congress or the President clearly modifies or terminates the Headquarters Agreement or the Agreement's arbitration clause, it is the law of the United States.2 °2
Second, under international law, the terms of treaties must be
followed. ' 3 Third, the United States should act in accord with
its stance taken in earlier cases, where it argued that parties
must abide by their international agreements and that such international obligations supersede domestic law. 20 4 Finally, the
refusal on the part of the United States to arbitrate, combined
with its denial to admit Yasir Arafat into the country to speak at
the United Nations, 205 its refusal to pay U.N. dues, 20 6 and its
times gone in construing domestic statutes so as to avoid conflict with international
agreements .... " Id.; see, e.g., Chew Heong v. U.S., 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
200. United States v. PL.O., 695 F. Supp. at 1468. The U.S. court cited to another section of the Foreign Relations Act, which specifically used the word treaty.
Id. That section refers to "United States law (including any treaty)." See 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 4315 (West Supp. 1989).
201. See Pear, U.S. IVill Allow P.L.O. to Maintain Its Office at U.N., N.Y. Times, Aug.

30, 1988, at Al, col. 6 (noting decision by United States not to appeal). This article
points out that the Justice Department wanted to appeal, while the State Department
was against an appeal, and that President Reagan made the final decision not to appeal. Id.
202. See infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 225-37 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
205. Statement Denying Visa for Arafat, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1988, at A5, col. 1
(quoting the official text of the State Department's denial of Arafat's visa application).
206. Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, 22
U.S.C § 2651 (Supp. V 1987), was the Act in which the United States first reduced its
contributions to the United Nations to a maximum of 20% of the U.N.'s annual
budget until the organization made certain reforms. See S. REP. No. 39, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 93, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 369-71. However, on
July 22, 1988, the United States announced that it would restore funding withheld
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withdrawal from the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction,20 7 suggests
a course of conduct that has caused many members of the international community to question U.S. credibility with respect
to its international obligations.2 0 8 In addition, this conduct by
because the United Nations had made the requested changes. 23 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 853-54 (July 27, 1988) (text of announcement).
207. See Letter from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral (Oct. 7, 1985) (announcing termination of U.S. acceptance of ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985); see also L. DAMROSCH, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 447 (1987) (discussing constitutional-

ity of Shultz's decision). Yet in 1989, the U.S. agreed to submit an international
dispute for arbitration to the ICJ for the first time since its 1985 rejection of the ICJ's
jurisdiction. Lewis, U.S. in Shift, Asks Arbitration in World Court, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13,
1989, at A5, col. 1.
208. See Franck, Taking Treaties Seriously, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 61 (1988). Franck
asserts that nations that violate treaties "simply stop being trusted." Id. at 62. Moreover, Franck claims that "[t]he U.S. Congress ...heedlessly mandates actions that its
own Government admits are in flagrant breach of treaty obligations." Id. Finally,
Franck concludes that "[a] nation that deliberately sets out to debase its treaty-worthiness, quite simply, is in danger of becoming a global street person: self-destructive and heedless of its own best interest." Id. U.N. representatives from various
countries made statements at the U.N. General Assembly in which they questioned
the commitment and credibility of the United States in relation to its treaty obligations. For instance, Mr. Badawi of Egypt stated that "[a]ll the members of the international community ...[must] base their relations with others on a recognized order
and system .... The gravity of this question lies ... in the fact that it can establish a
precedent ... to evade treaty obligations ... in similar cases." GeneralAssembly Provi-

sional Verbatim Records of the One-Hundredand First Meeting, 42 U.N. GAOR (101 st mtg.)
at 57, U.N. Doc. A/42/PV.101 (prov. ed. 1988) [hereinafter General Assembly
Records]. The representative from Singapore, Mr. Mahbubani, stated at this meeting
that
[iut
is easy enough to demonstrate adherence to principle when to do so is
convenient and advantageous . . . . The test of a country's adherence to

principle is when it is inconvenient to do so.... Those who try to subvert
long-standing and widely accepted international laws should bear in mind
the words ascribed to Sir Thomas More in the play A Man for All Seasons:
"This country's planted thick with laws from coast coast ... and if you
cut them down . . .do you really think that you could stand upright in the
winds that would blow then?"
Id. at 76. The Czechoslovakian representative, Mr. Zapotocky, stated that "this is not
only a deliberate violation of international obligations ... but also a gesture of arrogance towards the opinion of the international community, one that calls into question the United States commitment to the ideals and principles underlying the United
Nations Charter." Id. at 83. Mr. Abulhasen from Kuwait questioned "how... anyone [can] take the pains of formulating and concluding international agreements
when the United States seeks to impose the concept of the precedence of national
legislation over international agreements?" General Assembly Records, supra, 42
U.N. GAOR (105th mtg.) at 48-50, U.N. Doc. A/42/PV.105 (prov. ed. 1988). Mr.
Maksoud from the League of Arab States noted that "[t]here is too much at stake,
foremost the quality of the United States commitment to the United Nations and to
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the United States has caused certain members of the United
Nations to question the Organization's continued maintenance
of headquarters in the United States.2 °9
A. Domestic Law Requires Compliance with the Arbitration Clause
The U.S. Constitution refers to treaties as part of the
supreme law of the United States. 2 '0 Although the Headquarters Agreement is not a treaty, but an executive agreement authorized by a joint resolution of Congress, it is still considered
international law and obligations: United States credibility." Finally, Mr. Mudenge
from Zimbabwe asked "[w]hy [the United States was] working so hard to damage its
prestige and influence internationally?" General Assembly Records, supra, 42 U.N.
GAOR (109th mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/42/PV.109 (prov. ed. 1988).
209. U.N. Representatives of various countries made statements at the General
Assembly questioning the United Nations continued maintenance of headquarters in
the United States. For instance, Mr. AI-Masri from the Syrian Arab Republic stated
that U.S. "[i]nsistence on [the ATA's] implementation places the future of the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York in jeopardy." General Assembly
Records, supra note 208, 42 U.N. GAOR (101st mtg.) at 87, U.N. Doc. A/42/PV. 101
(prov. ed. 1988). Mr. Mansour from the Arab Republic of Yemen stated that "we
must make the host country choose between keeping the United Nations on its territory... as an independent and dignified Organization governed only by the will of its
Member States . . .or deciding that the United Nations should leave and make its
Headquarters in some other country." General Assembly Records, supra note 208,
42 U.N. GAOR (106th mtg.) at 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/42/PV. 106 (prov. ed. 1988). Mr.
Shah Nawaz from Pakistan stated that "the atmosphere is being vitiated by the spectacle of a head-on collision between the United Nations and one of its founding
Members which threatens to undermine the proper functioning of the United Nations in New York." General Assembly Records, supra note 208, 42 U.N. GAOR
(107th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/42/PV. 107 (prov. ed. 1988). Mr. H. M. Ali from the
Democratic People's Republic of Yemen stated that "[w]e must also consider
whether the location of the Organization in this country in the light of the present
violation is the best location possible." Id. at 43-45. Finally, Mr. Rabetafika from
Madigascar made the following statement:
How long ago, it seems, since the House of Representatives and the
United States Senate unanimously invited the United Nations to establish its
permanent Headquarters in the United States. And how soon may we have
to act out the classical drama of Tile elBerinice, in which Titus was compelled
to send Br~nice away, despite what either of them wished?
General Assembly Records, supra note 208, U.N. GAOR (108th mtg.) at 28, U.N.
Doc. A/42/PV. 108 (prov. ed. 1988).
210. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Article VI reads:
[2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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part of the supreme law of the land.2" 1 ' Prior to U.N. acceptance of the Headquarters Agreement, the United Nations, concerned that the agreement was not a treaty, asked the United
States whether U.S. law would treat an executive agreement
the same as a treaty.2 1 2 The U.S. Attorney General responded
that the Headquarters Agreement would act as the supreme
law of the land.2 I3 In addition, the U.S. court in the present
dispute referred to the Headquarters Agreement as a treaty,
noting that the relevant law implicated all forms of international agreements.214
The United States is obligated to abide by the Headquarters Agreement unless and until there is some clear intent
shown to terminate or modify the Agreement on the part of
either the United States or the United Nations, as parties to the
agreement,2 15 or the U.S. Congress, through the enactment of
subsequent legislation. 2t 6 However, there was no such intent,
for neither party expressed any desire to change the Agreement's status. 21 Further, the ATA does not specifically mention the PLO Observer Mission, nor does it state any intention
to override pre-existing treaties.21 8 Moreover, those legisla211. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) ("[Wlhile [the
supremacy] rule in respect of treaties is established by the express language of cl. 2,
Art. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would result in the case of all international
compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power over international
affairs is in the national government .... ").
212. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
214. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES

§ 332 (1988) [hereinafter

RESTATEMENT THIRD].

The Restatement Third

states that "[tihe termination or denunciation of an international agreement may take
place only (a) in conformity with the agreement or (b) by consent of all parties." Id.
216. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("[Ain act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if
any other possible construction remains ....

); see also RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra

note 215, § 114. Section 114 states that "[w]here fairly possible, a United States
statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States." Id. Section 115 states that "[a]n act of
Congress supersedes an earlier ... provision of an international agreement as law of
the United States if the purpose of the act is to supersede the earlier ... provision is
clear or if the act and the earlier ... provision cannot be fairly reconciled." Id. § 115.
217. See supra notes 55-86, 158-64 and accompanying text.
218. See Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, sec. 1003, 22 U.S.C.A. § 5202 (West Supp.
1989); supra note 71.

786 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 12:751
tors who sponsored the ATA did not indicate an intent to override the Headquarters Agreement.2 ' 9 The focus of the legislators' argument was that the ATA could be enforced without
violating the Headquarters Agreement. 220 Further, the State
Department did not take any actions to suggest that it intended
to modify or terminate the Agreement. 22 ' Thus, the U.S. court
determined that the Headquarters Agreement was still a bind22 2
ing treaty and, therefore, that the ATA did not supersede it;
but the U.S. court held that it could not enforce the Headquarters Agreement's arbitration clause due to the political question doctrine. 22 3' This decision was supported by a vast body of
Supreme Court case law. 2 24 Thus, the obligation to arbitrate
in the future rests entirely with the executive branch.
B. InternationalLaw Requires Compliance with
the Arbitration Clause
Article 38 of the ICJ's statute states that international law
arises from three sources: international agreements, customs,
and other general principles found in major legal systems. 2 5
If a custom is generally accepted by sovereign states, it becomes established as a general rule of international law, and
thereby binds those states that have not opposed it. 2 26 Trea219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060,

T.S. No. 993, at 30. Article 38 lists the following as sources of international law:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b) international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law;
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations ....
Id.; reprinted in S. ROSENNE, DOCUMENTS ON THE ICJ 79 (1979); see also I. BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 1973) (considering article 38 to
be the most complete statement on sources of international law).

226. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES
AND MATERIALS 65 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW] ("[l]f custom becomes established as a general rule of international law, it binds all States which have
not opposed it, whether or not they themselves played an active part in its formation." (quoting Waldcock, General Course on Public InternationalLaw, 106 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 49-53 (1962))); see also RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 215, § 102(2)
("[C]ustomary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
States followed by them from a sense of legal obligations.").
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ties, through custom, have become the generally accepted
mode by which parties regulate their relations.227 Behind this
acceptance of treaties lies the principle of pacta sunt servanda,
perhaps the most important concept in international law. 2 28 It

refers to the binding nature and good faith observance of treaties and includes the implication that international obligations
survive domestic law restrictions.229 Pacta sunt servanda was
codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties230 and the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations.231 In addition, the Charter of the
United Nations (the "UN Charter"),232 of which the United
importance of
States is a party, recognizes in its preamble 23the
3
parties maintaining their treaty obligations.

227. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 226, at 10 ("[1O]ne of the norms of international law created by custom authorizes the states to regulate their mutual relations
by treaty." (quoting KELSON, Pure Theory of Law 215-17 (1967))).
228. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supr note 215, § 321; see also Black's Law Dictionary 999 (5th ed. 1979) (defining pacla sunt servanda as meaning that "[a]greements
(and stipulations) of the parties (to a contract) must be observed").

229. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 215, § 321; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 226, at 433 (quoting LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 433 (1961),
regarding the binding effect of treaties).
In every uncodified legal system there are certain elementary and universally agreed principles for which it is almost impossible to find specific authority. In the Common Law of England and the United States of America,
where can you find specific authority for the principle that a man must perform his contracts? Yet almost every decision on a contract presupposes the
existence of that principle. The same is true of international law. No Government would decline to accept the principle pacta sunt servanda, and the
very fact that Governments find it necessary to spend so much effort in explaining in a particular case that the pactum has ceased to exist, or that the
act complained of is not a breach of it, either by reason of an implied term
or for some other reason, is the best acknowledgement of that principle.
Id.
230. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 8 I.L.M.
679, 690 (1969) (definingpacta sun! servanda as meaning that "[e]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith").
231. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, art. 26, 25 I.L.M. 543, 560 (1986) (definingpacta
sunt servanda as meaning that "[elvery treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith").
232. June 20, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (effective Oct. 24, 1945); see
supra notes 6, 9.
233. U.N. CHARTER, preamble (stating that one of its aims is "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties ... can
be maintained").
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Furthermore, article 33 of the UN Charter 234 and part I of
the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes235 both highlight the importance of dispute settlement treaty obligations.2 3 6 An ICJ judge has also written on
the need to respect arbitration treaties.2 3 v Therefore, the U.S.
refusal to abide by its international obligation to arbitrate
under the Headquarters Agreement, especially after the ICJ
advisory opinion directing it to do so, violated the basic tenets
of international law.
C. The Use of InternationalLaw as Both a Shield and a Sword
In the past, the United States has argued that obligations
under a treaty take precedence over a party's domestic laws.2 3 8
When the United States made these arguments, however, it
was the nation alleging a treaty violation. For instance, as far
back as the Alabama arbitration of 1872, the United States argued that a country's international duties under a treaty take
precedence over those of its own domestic laws. 3 9
In 1950, the United States argued to the ICJ that the sovereignty of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania was limited by
their treaty obligations and, consequently, these nations had
234. Id. art. 33. Article 33 siates:
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
Id.
235. G.A. Res. 37/10, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 261, U.N. Doc. A/37/51
(1982). This resolution, states that "[s]tates shall in accordance with international
law, implement in good faith all the provisions of agreements concluded by them for
the settlement of their disputes." Id. para. 11.
236. See supra notes 234-35.

237. See S.M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEMS (1947). Schwebel states the following:

ARBITRATION:

THREE

SALIENT

Arbitration treaties clearly are treaties; their interpretation is governed
by the rules of treaty interpretation. Where States have undertaken by
treaty to arbitrate, their obligation is binding. It is an obligation they are
bound to fulfill. Arbitration treaties, like other international contractual instruments, are to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
light of the treaty's object and purpose.
Id. at 149.
238. See supra notes 100, 151 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.

1989]

U.N. HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT

789

no grounds to refuse. to arbitrate in accordance with each of
their treaty obligations.2"0 In addition, the United States
claimed that these countries were acting illegally by not selecting arbitrators.241
In the current case, the United Nations, and not the
United States, was the party making the claim and seeking to
invoke the Agreement's dispute settlement clause.2 4 2 In comparing the U.S. position in this case with its previous position,
it appears that the United States has changed its position to
suit its needs and, in effect, has used the law as both a shield
and a sword. This inconsistent adherence to the principles of
international law will likely cause the international community
to approach skeptically the United States with respect to international obligations in the future.
CONCLUSION
The refusal of the United States to arbitrate in accordance
with the Headquarters Agreement is an example of this country's recent attitude towards the United Nations. As a founding member, the United States should show a greater respect
for the agreements it makes with the United Nations, in addition to the basic international law concept of abiding by treaty
commitments. Therefore, the United States should abide by
the Headquarters Agreement and willingly submit to arbitration all future disputes with the United Nations that concern
the interpretation or application of the Agreement to arbitration.
Jeffrey L. Shore*
240. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
241. Id.
242. See supra note 76.
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